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Meritocracy as Plutocracy: the Marketising of 
‘equality’ under neoliberalisM
Jo Littler
Abstract Meritocracy, in contemporary parlance, refers to the idea that whatever our social position 
at birth, society ought to facilitate the means for ‘talent’ to ‘rise to the top’. This article argues that the 
ideology of ‘meritocracy’ has become a key means through which plutocracy is endorsed by stealth within 
contemporary neoliberal culture. The article attempts to analyse the term ‘meritocracy’, to open up 
understandings of its genealogy, and to comprehend its current use. It does so through three sections. The 
first section considers what might be wrong with the notion of meritocracy. The second traces some key 
points in the travels of the concept within and around academic social theory, moving from Alan Fox and 
Michael Young’s initial, disparaging use of the term in the 1950s, to Daniel Bell’s approving adoption 
of the concept in the 1970s, and on to its take-up by neoconservative think tanks in the 1980s. The third 
section analyses the use of meritocracy as a plank of neoliberal political rhetoric and public discourse. 
It focuses on the resonance of the term in relatively recent British culture, discussing how what it terms 
‘meritocratic feeling’ has come to operate in David Cameron’s ‘Aspiration Nation’. This final section 
argues that meritocracy has become a potent blend of an essentialised and exclusionary notion of ‘talent’, 
competitive individualism and the need for social mobility. Today it is a discourse which predominantly 
works to marketise the very idea of equality. 
Keywords aspiration, equality, meritocracy, mobility, neoliberalism, plutocracy
OF LADDERS AND SNAKES
We are building an Aspiration Nation. A country where it’s not who you know, or where 
you’re from; but who you are and where you’re determined to go. My dream for Britain is 
that opportunity is not an accident of birth, but a birthright. 
              David Cameron, Conservative Party Spring Conference, March 2013
The UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor George Osborne have repeatedly 
evoked the image of Britain as an ‘Aspiration Nation’: as a country in which all people, no 
matter where they’re from, have the opportunity to climb the ladder of social mobility.1 This 
is the language of meritocracy: the idea that whatever our social position at birth, society 
ought to offer enough opportunity and mobility for ‘talent’ to combine with ‘effort’ in order 
to ‘rise to the top’.
 Meritocratic rhetoric is not confined to the UK. In the US, for instance, President Obama’s 
2013 inaugural address proclaimed that ‘we are true to our creed when a little girl born 
into the bleakest poverty knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else’.2 
Meritocracy has deep and varied historical lineages; in the UK, it can be connected back to 
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the Victorian self-help tradition, and in the US to the emergence of the idea of aspirational 
consumerism as defining the ‘American Dream’ in the early twentieth century. Today, in 
many countries across the global North, the idea that we should live in a ‘meritocracy’ has 
become integral to contemporary structures of feeling: assumed by both right-wing and left-
wing political parties, heavily promoted in educational discourse, and animating popular 
culture, meritocracy has become an idea as uncontroversial and as homely as ‘motherhood 
and apple pie’.3 Why should issue be taken with such an apparently innocuous concept, 
one whose potency lies in its investment in the conception of social mobility, pitted against 
‘older’ forms of inherited privilege?
In this essay I argue that we should pay close attention to meritocracy because it has 
become a key ideological means by which plutocracy - or government by a wealthy elite - 
perpetuates itself through neoliberal culture. It is not, in other words, merely a coincidence 
that the common idea that we live, or should live, in a meritocratic age co-exists with a 
pronounced lack of social mobility and the continuation of vested hereditary economic 
interests.4 Meritocratic discourse, as I show below, is currently being actively mobilised by 
members of a plutocracy to extend their own interests and power. Contemporary meritocracy 
operates to marketise the very idea of equality and can be understood in the light of Foucault’s 
formulation of neoliberalism as a state in which competitive markets are not conceptualised 
as the ‘natural’ order of things (as they were under classical liberalism), but as entities that 
need to be produced.5 This helps explain some of the tenacity of the power of meritocracy, 
despite its clear contradictions, and how it works as a mechanism to both perpetuate, and 
create, social and cultural inequality.
 This essay explores this argument by sketching partial but hopefully nonetheless revealing 
genealogies of meritocratic discourse. Discussions of meritocracy have largely either taken place 
around education or have been empirical analyses of whether or not the meritocratic nature of 
existing social institutions can be verified.6 Reflecting on the cultural politics of its genealogy can 
add to our understanding of meritocratic ideas and the worlds they have shaped. In this article 
I pursue this analysis through three sections. The first brief section of this paper considers what 
might be wrong with the notion of meritocracy. The second traces some key points in the travels 
of the concept within and around academic social theory, moving from Alan Fox and Michael 
Young’s initial, disparaging use of the term in the 1950s, to Daniel Bell’s approving adoption 
of the concept in the 1970s, and on to its take-up by neoconservative think tanks in the 1980s. 
The third section considers the use of meritocracy as a plank of neoliberal political rhetoric and 
public discourse. This focuses on the resonance of the term in relatively recent British culture, 
from a Thatcherite ‘anti-establishment’ version through to the explicit Blairite adoption of 
the concept, and on to its contemporary life in coalition discourse as part of David Cameron’s 
putative project to build an ‘Aspiration Nation’. For to understand how meritocracy is deployed 
by neoliberalism we need to comprehend it both in terms of its relationship to broader contexts 
and in terms of the specific ways in which it is being shaped at the present time.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH MERITOCRACY?
What is wrong with meritocracy? Given that the concept of meritocracy is today largely 
normalised as wholly beneficial, it is worth highlighting some of the problems with the concept 
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as it is generally understood in the present.
 To begin with, the logic of meritocracy assumes that ‘talent’ or ‘intelligence’ is inborn from 
birth: it depends, in other words, on an essentialised conception of intellect and aptitude. It 
primarily assumes an ability which is inborn and either given the chance or not to ‘succeed’. This 
notion of intelligence is singular and linear. It is in opposition to conceptions of intelligence 
as multiple and various, which can change and grow in numerous directions. Carried to its 
logical conclusion, such a hermetic conception of intelligence as a sealed and singular entity 
shares, as Young intimated in The Rise of the Meritocracy, the logic of eugenics.7 This elitist 
‘myth of inherent difference’ accelerated in intensity in affluent nations during the 1950s, and 
in Britain, as Danny Dorling points out, ‘the state enthusiastically sponsored the division of 
children into types, with the amount spent per head on grammar school children being much 
higher than on those at the alternative secondary moderns’.8 What Dorling terms ‘apartheid 
schooling’ was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s, but it was this 1950s rising tide of elitist 
stratification in both schools and society that in part prompted Michael Young’s initial use of 
the term in 1958.
 The second key problem with meritocracy is that it endorses a competitive, linear, 
hierarchical system in which by definition people must be left behind. The top cannot exist 
without the bottom. Not everyone can ‘rise’. Unrealised talent is therefore both the necessary 
and structural condition of its existence. The forms taken by contemporary celebrity and the 
reality/talent shows have exemplified this structure,9 publicly dramatising their assumptions 
while offering the basis for key forms of public entertainment. Meritocracy offers a ‘ladder’ 
system of social mobility, promoting a socially corrosive ethic of competitive self-interest which 
both legitimises inequality and damages community ‘by requiring people to be in a permanent 
state of competition with each other’.10 The classic meritocratic trope of the ladder was recently 
reinvigorated in the UK by David Cameron’s 2013 Conservative Party Conference pledge to 
offer the ‘ladder of opportunity for all to climb’. As Raymond Williams argued in 1963, the 
ladder is a perfect symbol of the bourgeois idea of society, because while it undoubtedly offers 
the opportunity to climb, it is a device which can only be used individually; you go up the ladder 
alone’. Such an ‘alternative to solidarity’, pointed out Williams, has dazzled many working-class 
leaders, and is objectionable in two respects: it weakens community and the task of common 
betterment and ‘sweetens the poison of hierarchy’ by offering growth through merit rather 
than money or birth, whilst retaining a commitment to the very notion of hierarchy itself.11 
 The third key problem with the ideology of meritocracy is in the hierarchical ranking of 
professions and status it endorses. Certain professions are positioned at the ‘top’, but why 
they are there - and whether they should be there - tends to be less discussed. Why do a singer 
or entrepreneur become roles to aspire to above those of a vet or a nurse? Why, as income 
disparity widens, are celebrity-based professions rising in ascribed status? Whilst one obvious 
answer is ‘income’, these questions are not ones that the contemporary neoliberal logic of 
meritocracy foregrounds. There is also a historical dimension to the answer, which relates 
to the shifting composition of social mobility. Academic research on social mobility usually 
differentiates between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ social mobility.12 ‘Absolute’ social mobility 
refers to the movement in occupational classes from one generation to the next. In the UK 
there was a high level of movement between 1945 and the mid 1980s due to the growth in 
professional employment in the public sector (especially in education and health) and in 
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service sector employment, which drew disproportionately on the newly-educated children 
of manual workers: a phenomenon which has since reduced with the combined effects of 
public sector spending cuts since the 1980s and shrinkage in the service economy. Measuring 
‘relative’ social mobility involves comparing rates at which those from ‘lower down’ move up, 
compared to how many ‘higher up’ fall down; and as Vikki Boliver and David Byrne recently 
argue, not only has there been ‘little if any sign of [people] becoming any more equal over 
time’ but with a crumbling middle class, ‘upward mobility increasingly necessitates downward 
mobility’.13 Such patterns help explain both the mid-century cultural validation of professional 
occupations and the expanding late twentieth-century focus on entrepreneurialism and 
celebrity. In a landscape of extreme poverty and wealth, entrepreneurialism and celebrity 
rags-to-riches tales become highlighted, or rendered ‘luminous’, to borrow Angela McRobbie’s 
term;14 they become publicly visible opportunities to ‘escape’ an otherwise entrenched 
position of social subordination.
 The notion of ‘escape’, however, introduces the fourth, interconnected, problem: 
meritocracy’s validation of upper-middle class values as norms to aspire to and it’s rendering 
of working-class cultures as abject. The language of meritocracy is about moving ‘upwards’ in 
financial and class terms, but whilst this may entail, for example, being better fed, it does not 
mean existing in a ‘better’ or ‘happier’ culture. Middle-class suburbs are not usually better 
places for socialising or connecting with a range of people than housing estates, for instance.15 
Discourses of meritocracy, however, assume that all movement must happen upwards, and 
in the process contributes to the positioning of working-class cultures as the ‘underclass’, as 
abject zones and lives to flee from. As Imogen Tyler has shown powerfully in her recent book 
Revolting Subjects, this is a tendency that has exacerbated under neoliberalism.16
 The fifth key problem with meritocracy, and the problem which moves us into the territory 
of considering why it has such currency and power, is that it functions as an ideological myth to 
obscure economic and social inequalities and the role it plays in curtailing social equality. Recent 
social science research mapping social mobility has gestured in this direction; McNamee and 
Miller for instance have argued that in America meritocracy is a description that is both inaccurate 
and harmful, and that its use legitimises inequalities of power and privilege through ‘claims 
that are demonstrably false’.17 As we will see later, one of the key components of this ideological 
myth is how ‘effort’ - which in a meritocratic system combines with ‘talent’ to produce merit - is 
over-valued, and social and economic location is not considered or ignored. The emphasis on 
‘effort’ is the key element of meritocracy that has been expanded in recent years.
 Meritocracy might therefore be broadly characterised as a potent blend of an essentialised 
and exclusionary notion of ‘talent’, competitive individualism and the need for social mobility. 
The following sections analyse this particular cultural cocktail, and consider how the claims 
of meritocracy have worked and circulated in terms of social theory, political narrative and 
public discourse. 
1. THE GENEALOGY OF A CONCEPT: SOCIALIST ROOTS
In order to trace the way the concept has travelled, we can revisit the moment of its emergence; 
for although the discourses it mobilised have longer histories, this is one useful and significant 
starting point. Michael Young is widely regarded as coining the term ‘meritocracy’ in his 1958 
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book The Rise of the Meritocracy, which is the earliest citation of the word in the OED. Contrary 
to popular opinion, however, the term was in fact used two years earlier by Alan Fox in his 
article ‘Class and Equality’ in the journal Socialist Commentary, as the British historian David 
Kynaston recently notes in his book Modernity Britain: Opening the Box, 1957-59.18 As Kynaston is 
not especially interested in meritocracy he devotes only a couple of sentences to his discovery, 
but in terms of the etymology of the word and its cultural currency, this is a significant and 
quite remarkable finding.
 What is striking about Fox’s article is that it is more extensively critical and politically radical 
use of the term than Michael Young’s (which I discuss below). Alan Fox was to become an 
influential industrial sociologist whose radical perspective on industrial relations challenged 
the liberal orthodoxy of the discipline. In 1956 he was a researcher at Nuffield College Oxford, 
where he worked on a history of British trade unions and a history of the National Union 
of Boot and Shoe Operatives (ODNB 2013). The journal the article appeared in, Socialist 
Commentary, was the weekly publication of the Socialist Vanguard Group, a political group on 
the left of the Labour party. In 1955 Clement Atlee described Socialist Commentary as ‘a useful 
corrective to the New Statesman’ (a more mainstream UK left weekly magazine).19 
 Fox’s article is a careful sociological summary of the policies, social apparatuses and 
ideologies that reproduce and legitimate social stratification. It considers the role of ‘the 
four scales’ - income, property, education and occupation - in solidifying inequality of 
position. It discusses how these factors are interconnected, with, for example, low incomes 
having made it impossible for workers ‘to break out of the vicious circle which cramped 
their lives’ (Class&Equality, p12). Fox tends to focus on industrial work. He suggests that we 
might understand social inequality by looking at extremes of occupational status and ways 
of categorising their social standing (‘Is it dirty and laborious or the reverse of those things? 
Is it carried out under discipline and supervision, or under conditions permitting personal 
independence, initiative and discretion?’). Whilst he raises the hope that mechanisation and 
worker’s demands on the shop floor will make blue collar lives better, he suggests that this is 
only part of the story. For even if mechanisation improves and unionisation succeeds, social 
stratification will remain. For Fox, inequality
will remain as long as we assume it to be a law of nature that those of higher occupational 
status must not only enjoy markedly superior education as well but also, by right and of 
necessity, have a higher income into the bargain. As long as that assumption remains - as 
long as violations of it are regarded as grotesque paradoxes - then so long will our society be 
divisible into the blessed and the unblessed - those who get the best and most of everything, 
and those who get the poorest and the least. This way lies the ‘meritocracy’; the society 
in which the gifted, the smart, the energetic, the ambitious and the ruthless are carefully 
sifted out and helped towards their destined positions of dominance, where they proceed 
not only to enjoy the fulfilment of exercising their natural endowments but also to receive 
a fat bonus thrown in for good measure. 
This is not enough. Merely to devise bigger and better ‘sieves’ (equality of opportunity’) to 
help the clever boys get to the top and then pile rewards on them when they get there is 
the vision of a certain brand of New Conservatism; it has never been the vision of socialism 
(Classs&Equality, p13).
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I quote this at length because it is both a remarkable and remarkably unquoted passage. 
It indicates the radical origins of critiques of meritocracy - roots that have been obscured - 
alongside the extent to which it has travelled as a term. For Fox, ‘meritocracy’ is a term of 
abuse. It denotes a society in which ‘the gifted, the smart, the energetic, the ambitious and 
ruthless’ not only reap the rewards for their (dubious or admirable) skills but receive too much: 
these ‘fat bonus’[es], the rewards piled on them, are excessive and mean that others suffer.
As a result of this analysis, he suggests ‘cross-grading’ as a route towards greater equality, which 
is conceptualised not only in financial terms, but also in terms of time, education and leisure. 
He offers pointers towards policies of redistribution; these 
might mean, perhaps, refusing to accept the idea that to prolong the education of secondary 
modern pupils beyond the age of fifteen is ‘a waste of time’. It might mean that those who 
perform the dull and repetitive jobs in which our economy abounds receive substantially 
more leisure than the rest (Class&Equality, p13).
Fox’s remarkable article, in which the earliest use of ‘meritocracy’ to be recorded to date 
appears, is therefore an explicitly socialist argument against the very logic of ‘meritocracy’. 
These origins were forgotten, however, until 2013, in favour of consistent attention to Michael 
Young’s playful, dystopian social satire, The Rise of the Meritocracy. 
FROM YOUNG TO ‘MATURE’ MERITOCRACY
The Rise of the Meritocracy was published in 1958 and set in 2034. It is voiced by a pompous 
narrator who draws on the PhD thesis of the now-deceased social scientist ‘Michael Young’ - 
who (we learn at the end) died in a ferocious battle caused by the problems with the new social 
system of meritocracy. ‘Meritocracy’ here is understood as produced through the formula I + 
E = M, or ‘Intelligence combined with Effort equals Merit’. The first half of the book depicts 
early twentieth-century Britain from the vantage point of a science-fiction future. It charts 
the demise of the old, class-bound, nepotistic order, in which kinship triumphs over skill and 
the rich bequeath their social worlds to their children, as a world overthrown by movements 
for greater social equality. The second half relates the ascendancy of the new system of merit, 
which turns out to lead not to an equal society, but rather to a new caste system in which IQ 
determines social station. In this world, the lower rungs of both ex-rich and ex-poor are dim-
witted and, to borrow contemporary terminology, ‘socially excluded’; careers tend to dip after 
people reach 40 or 50; and there is a roaring black-market trade in brainy babies. The book 
concludes by gesturing towards the 2034 ‘Battle of Peterloo’ when an alliance of housewives 
and ‘Populists’ fight back on May Day against meritocracy. We learn that it was in this battle 
that ‘Michael Young’ died.
 Rejected by a number of publishers, including one who wanted it refashioned into a novel 
in the style of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World - which Young did, although that particular 
version, intriguingly, never got published - The Rise of the Meritocracy eventually became a UK 
bestseller. This was in itself indicative of what Mike Savage has described as the unprecedented 
power of sociology in mid-twentieth century Britain.20 The book portrays a hidebound, class-
bound British society as grossly unfair, and registers the seismic post-war moves towards a 
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more egalitarian society and the redistribution of resources by the welfare state. But it is also, 
clearly, a book in which meritocracy is not depicted as a problem-free goal that such class-
bound societies should strive for. On the contrary, it is presented as an ideology or organising 
principle that will become a problem by leading to new inequalities of power and forms of 
social stratification.
 Through its satire, The Rise of the Meritocracy was both questioning the way the social order 
was being re-made and connecting to older political-philosophical debates around merit. 
These debates included, for example, Emile Durkheim’s vision of society providing ‘free space 
to all merits’; those of the US structuralist-functionalists of the 1940s and 1950s, who sought 
to update his ideas; and the scepticism of British social democratic radicals of the interwar 
period like Tawney, Cole and Hobson, who argued that the production of ‘merit’ needed to be 
understood instead as a more egalitarian co-operative process.21 Young’s political-philosophical 
position was closer to the latter. As a key writer of the 1945 Labour Party manifesto Let Us Face 
the Future and Labour’s Director of Research, Young wrote The Rise of the Meritocracy in part 
as a warning shot to his party against newly emergent forms of social division.22 The book is 
critical of tendencies toward over-valorising innate ability and of expanding hierarchies in 
education. As Raymond Williams argued in a review of Young’s book, ‘[w]e think of intelligence 
as absolute and limited because we have been told to think so, by this kind of society. It seems 
increasingly obvious, in practice, that our concepts of intelligence are peculiarly unintelligent’.23
 ‘Meritocracy’ came to shift away from this overtly satirical meaning so that notoriously, by 
the 1990s New Labour under Tony Blair had adopted a non-satirical idea of ‘a meritocratic 
society’ with gusto. Shortly before his death, Young wrote of how the term had been adopted 
by Blair and widely disseminated in the US, but not in the way he intended. It had been 
misunderstood, and so New Labour should stop using the term, he argued in an oft-quoted 
article for the Guardian. For Young, the unironic way ‘meritocracy’ was now deployed, which 
worked by ‘sieving people according to education’s narrow band of values […w]ith an amazing 
battery of certificates and degrees’ meant that social stratifications had hardened, those 
demoted to the bottom of the social pile were deemed unworthy and demoralised; and that 
‘no underclass has ever been left as morally naked’.24
 I will come to the issue of how meritocracy changed in meaning from the 1960s onward 
below, but it is worth considering how Young’s book itself - or rather, the text and its author’s 
paratextual framings of it - may have contributed, despite themselves, to such ‘misreadings’.25 
For whilst The Rise of the Meritocracy is a text which is known for being disparaging of meritocracy, 
there is also a fair amount of ambiguity on this issue to both the text and itself and to Michael 
Young’s comments on it. Its author claimed that Rise was ‘intended to present two sides of the 
case - the case against as well as the case for a meritocracy’ (Rise of Meritocracy, pxvii). In the 
book, whilst ‘meritocracy’ is valued for its ability to dismantle inherited privilege, it is also 
damned for its power to create new, unfair social divisions. The fictional ‘Chelsea Manifesto’ is 
the clearest expression of an alternative to both, with its often powerful arguments for equality, 
for valuing ‘kindliness and courage, sympathy and generosity’ over narrow conceptions of 
intelligence; and yet this alternative vision is truncated and cut off. Neither was the author’s 
paratextual activity always consistent. For instance, Young stated that he supported the ideal 
of a classless society, yet when asked in the 2000s whether the book was arguing for resistance 
to the nascent elitism of the meritocracy by promoting ‘the comprehensive idea’, replied with 
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an unexpansive but unequivocal ‘no’.26
 Young, who was director of the Institute of Community Studies at the time of writing 
the book, later became a founder and co-founder of a variety of institutions key to post-war 
British life and progressive social education, including the Open University, The Consumer’s 
Association and the University of the Third Age. He was deeply committed to formations 
which enabled innovative forms of participation and engagement with political and social 
structures. It is for this reason that his legacy is held in such high regard in the UK today. 
This is a political-conceptual lineage which connects Young’s work with that of contemporary 
advocates of participatory democracy; the tentative conclusion of the book’s story, in which 
the housewives and other populists rise up together, is symptomatic of this tendency.
 Yet whilst arguing against ‘the big organisation’, Young’s primary model or template for 
participation was the nuclear family. As Hilary Land makes clear in her essay about Rise, 
the book, whilst anticipating a feminist critique of ‘merit’, does not particularly challenge 
conventionally gendered divisions of labour;27 nor, we can add, its heteronormativity, nor its 
singular means of conceptualising ‘social closeness’. We can also note that Young’s antipathy 
towards large organisations involved being decidedly ambivalent / hostile towards nationalised 
industries; at its most left wing, this involved promoting mutual aid and ‘neighbourly socialism’; 
at its least, it involved joining the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and not making any explicit 
critique of capitalism. The emphasis on economic and cultural redistribution which is 
foregrounded in Fox’s account is downplayed in Young’s.
 What this means is that whilst Rise clearly critiques an essentialised and individualised notion 
of merit and implicitly eugenicist approaches to intelligence, its relationship to comprehensive 
provision, and indeed to capitalism, is somewhat less clear. And whilst responsibility for what 
happens to any concept, book or term cannot obviously be laid at the feet, the brain or the 
typewriting fingers of the author, the persistence of such textual lacunae is a key factor in how 
the term later became deployed. The paradoxical nature of Young’s historical position is also 
apparent in the tendency of commentators to describe him as the original ‘social entrepreneur’,28 
a phrase which has now become decidedly ambivalent: reflecting not only innovative brilliance 
at creating socially beneficial initiatives (at which Young excelled), but also what was to become 
a wider saturation of the field of social policy by neoliberal entrepreneurialism.
‘JUST’ MERITOCRACY?
In 1973, in his classic text, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Daniel Bell - American sociologist 
and friend of Michael Young - pronounced that ‘the post-industrial society, in its logic, is a 
meritocracy’.29 The impact of the 1960s movements and struggles by those disenfranchised by 
the worker hierarchies of the Fordist settlement - women, non-whites, gay people - entailed a 
hugely significant challenge to and partial rupture of the dominant lines of social stratification. 
For example, after the 1963 Equal Pay Act in the US, and the 1970 Equal Pay Act in the UK, 
it was no longer legal to pay men and women differently for doing the same job, even if the 
struggle over equal pay for work of equal value - and against cultural prejudices against what 
it is possible for a woman or man to do - remains necessary.
 These challenges to social mobility were engendered through and alongside the shift to a 
‘post-industrial’, post-Fordist society and culture. Post-Fordist culture and society has involved a 
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range of notable developments, including: the rapid growth in consumer-oriented production, 
branding and the service sector, the mobilisation of just-in-time ICTs in the service of ‘the 
creative industries’, industrial downsizing, manufacturing contracting-overseas, and the 
neoliberal erosion of worker’s rights and the social provisions of the welfare state in favour of 
privatised solutions and social risk being borne by ‘the individual’.30
 In The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Bell uses ‘meritocracy’ to refer primarily to the new 
forms of social mobility which are engendered within allegedly ‘post-industrial’ society. This 
is important: as use of the term ‘meritocracy’ in Bell’s text works to neutralise and erase those 
more problematic (or ‘dystopian’) aspects of the term present in Young’s work and powerfully 
critiqued in Fox’s essay. Bell elaborates upon his ideas about meritocracy in a now more 
obscure text: a 1972 article ‘On meritocracy and equality’ in the journal The Public Interest. 
This article is fascinating as it forms a mid-point in the journey of meritocratic ideology 
from object of satirical scorn (in Rise) to central and explicit tenet of neoliberalism (as in 
the pamphlet which I consider in the next section from the Social Market Foundation). The 
Public Interest was a quarterly American public policy journal aimed at journalists, academics 
and policy makers founded by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol in 1965. Irving Kristol, writer, 
journalist and publisher, was dubbed ‘the godfather of neoconservatism’ when he featured 
on the cover of Esquire magazine in 1979, a moniker he later adopted and adapted in his 
books including Reflections of a Neoconservative, The Neoconservative Persuasion and Two Cheers 
for Capitalism. Bell dropped his involvement with the journal from the late 1970s, as it lurched 
further to the right.31
 Bell’s interpretation of meritocracy was therefore a meeting point between Young’s social-
democratic version - Young explicitly refers to Bell as ‘a friend’ in the 1994 introduction to The 
Rise of the Meritocracy - and neoconservatism (Rise of Meritocracy, pxv). This is palpable in the 
article. It is a thorough, carefully written piece, in which Bell argues for a distinction between 
‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equality of result’. There has been a conceptual confusion 
between these positions, the article argues, drawing on the work of John Rawls. Which do we 
want? Bell claims that ‘equality of result’ is a socialist ethic, whereas ‘equality of opportunity’ 
is a liberal one.32 In the process, he questions the value of affirmative action programmes and 
comes, eventually, to argue for ‘a just meritocracy’ which is ‘made up of those who have earned 
their authority’, as opposed to an ‘unjust’ one which ‘makes those distinctions invidious and 
demeans those below’.33
 In this text the usage of ‘meritocracy’ comes to adopt the lineaments of the form we know 
today. It is an unambiguously positive and valorised term. It is also one which argues in favour 
of ‘opportunity’. This is familiar territory to a contemporary readership. However, what 
distinguishes it from current usage are two important contextual points. First, the terrain on 
which meritocracy operates is one of high confidence in economic growth, as evidenced by 
virtue of Bell being able to debate whether or not ‘we have reached the post-scarcity state of 
full abundance’. This is clearly a moment before either the 1970s recession or the later ‘peak 
oil’ crisis hit. Second, and related, the position from which Bell speaks is defined by a political 
context in which widespread support for the Keyesian consensus has not yet collapsed, a 
context that has resulted in ‘a steady decrease in income disparity between persons’.34 To put 
it bluntly: putting a competitive vision of meritocracy into play is not hugely conspicuous or 
controversial at a time when there is a strong social safety net.
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From this position, in which the Fordist welfare settlement offset the worst extremes of capitalist 
division and its attendant social squalor, and from high confidence in expanding economic 
growth, meritocracy is, for Bell, to be conceived as a social system in which ‘just’ rewards and 
small gradations of privilege and position can be given to differential talent. From here, it 
might even be used as a motor for greater growth: 
And there is no reason why the principle of meritocracy should not obtain in business and 
government as well. One wants entrepreneurs and innovators who can expand the amount 
of productive wealth for society.35
And so the ambiguities of The Rise of the Meritocracy are resolved in favour of a specific usage 
which is quite different from Young’s. For Bell, IQ is far less problematic than for Young. 
He is not so interested in the potential of local or participatory power or the extent of social 
levelling proposed by Fox. He is interested in achieving a social order in which the excesses 
of capitalism are curbed by the state, and hopes that meritocracy can be recalibrated in such a 
way as to avoid it solidifying into the new caste system imagined by Young, instead providing 
an incitement-engine for a dynamic yet just society. Here meritocracy starts to become posited 
as an engine of ‘productive wealth’.
MERITOCRACY IN THE NEOLIBERAL LABORATORY
Bell’s vision of meritocracy emerged from a historical situation characterised by the presence 
of a strong welfare state which could offset the most extreme effects of market-produced 
social inequality In this context, meritocracy could be imagined as a dynamic engine both 
of ‘opportunity’ for social mobility, shaking up an ossified class system, and for ambiguously 
imagined ‘productive wealth’ - a term vague enough to be used by actors across the political 
spectrum. By the 1990s, however, this ambiguity was being aggressively exploited by the right, 
as the concept of ‘meritocracy’ became mobilised in explicit opposition to social democracy.
In Britain, a 1995 pamphlet by Adrian Wooldridge from the Social Market Foundation, 
Meritocracy and the classless society, argued for a vision of meritocracy which was explicitly 
pitted against comprehensive education, student grants, housing benefit, and any other kind 
of collective provision. Meritocracy is here opposed to what Wooldridge calls the ‘niceness 
revolution’ of the ’60s and ’70s. As part of this, it is explicitly opposed to ‘community’36 and to 
the welfare state, which is figured as ‘an obstacle’ to spreading meritocratic values’.37 Meritocracy 
in Woolridge’s version then is explicitly bound up with the logic of a capitalist market and with 
entrepreneurialism, and very much against the collective provision of social democracy and 
the welfare state. Here meritocracy fully embraces the liberal idea of ‘equality of opportunity’ 
and renders it synonymous with economic growth, capitalist competition and marketisation. 
Meritocracy is marketised and marketisation is good.
 We can understand the development of this framework more capaciously by drawing on 
Michel Foucault’s series of distinctions between liberalism and neo-liberalism in his prescient 
1978-9 College de France lecture series (which forms the backdrop to his account of biopolitics, 
published in French in 2004 and English in 2008). Foucault is insistent on the need to grasp 
the distinctions between liberalism and neoliberalism, to grasp their singularity, to ‘show you 
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precisely that neoliberalism is really something else’ (Birth of Biopolitics, p130). For Foucault, 
the ‘something else’ neoliberalism became was a situation in which ‘the overall exercise of 
political power can be modeled on the principles of a market economy’ (Birth of Biopolitics, 
p131). In other words, it was not just that the market became dominant, but that, since the 
1970s it has begun to structure the way political power itself works.
 Foucault describes how, to create this regime, classical liberalism had to be subjected to 
a number of transformations. A key transformation is that whilst classical liberalism accepts 
monopolies, neo-liberalism doesn’t: competition under neoliberalism is not considered natural, 
but structured (Birth of Biopolitics, pp134-137). Moreover, the only ‘true’ aims of social policy 
for neoliberalism can be economic growth and privatisation; thus the multiplication of the 
‘enterprise’ form within the social body, Foucault states, is what is at stake in neoliberalism, 
and it is what comes to constitute the ‘formative power of society’ (Birth of Biopolitics, p148).
 In Wooldridge’s formulation, meritocracy becomes a means of actively intervening to 
multiply the enterprise form within the social body. For example, he sees danger both in the 
hereditary interests of the Lords, and in Thatcher’s inability to ‘undermine the comprehensive 
principle in state schools’.38 The vision, in other words, is of a starkly stratified society, one in 
which people can travel according to their inborn ‘merit’. It finds legitimate vast inequalities 
of wealth and poverty as long as the potential to travel through them for those savvy enough is 
maintained. The distaste for the masses, towards the ‘all and sundry’ model of comprehensive 
education, combines revulsion toward ‘standardisation’ and toward the masses who fall out of 
view when the socially mobile are focused upon. These terms are elided.
 Interestingly, Woolridge’s pamphlet was produced by the Social Market Foundation 
(SMF), a cross-political party think tank. The very name ‘Social Market Foundation’ bears 
out Foucault’s claim that neoliberal rhetoric works to incite marketisation throughout the 
social body, while strongly echoing Michael Young’s language of social entrepreneurialism: 
neoliberalism, as analysed by Foucault, and Young’s own political discourse, here become 
almost wholly intertwined. In this influential pamphlet, a product of several decades of New 
Right thinking, ‘meritocracy’ is unambiguously posited as an engine of competition against 
supposedly debilitating forms of social collaboration.
2. MERITOCRATIC FEELING: THE MOVEMENT OF MERITOCRACY IN BRITISH 
POLITICAL RHETORIC 
The meaning meritocracy was taking at this moment was then clearly being shaped by the public 
emergence of neoliberalism from the 1970s. What we might call ‘meritocratic feeling’ - drawing 
from Raymond Williams’ idea of ‘structures of feeling’ alongside recent emphasis on affect - was 
shaped through political discourse, emotive appeals and cultural rhetoric.39 In Britain neoliberal 
policies and ideas of meritocracy were profoundly shaped, from the late 1970s, by Thatcherism, 
which made a meritocratic appeal to social mobility whilst dismantling the welfare state’s social 
safety net and initiating the long wave of privatisation with the sale of public utilities like gas, 
telecommunications and rail.40 Thatcherism normalised the marketisation of public services 
as the only possible response to the supposed malaise of the Keynesian industrial economy 
and articulated it to a very specific and partial idea of social mobility.
 It is worth re-visiting the specific terms in which meritocratic aspiration was expressed. 
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This form of meritocratic discourse linked a notion of achievement and merit towards 
successful consumption and away from intelligence. It habitually expressed distaste for 
ingrained privilege, particularly if it was in any way supported by the state. At the same time 
it was typically characterised by social conservatism in its attitudes to sexuality and gender: in 
particular attaching huge rhetorical importance to the heteronormative nuclear family and 
by repeatedly invoking imperialist white privilege.41 Whilst Thatcherism worked in multiple 
ways to secure consent for its politics, one of the most important was its meritocratic appeal to 
consumerism as a general mode of participation in public life which invited people to identify 
with the notion of themselves as consumers rather than as workers or citizens in a range of 
public settings. The presentation of acquisitive consumerism as the route to empowerment in 
any social context was closely bound up with the implicit assumption that the accumulation 
of consumer goods was at once a sign of merit and its tangible reward. One of the most 
significant moments in her first term was precisely designed to re-position a population of 
public-resource users as private owner/consumers: when she gave municipal tenants the right 
to buy the housing they lived in for prices that were very far below market rates.42 Crucially 
this government-subsidised housing stock wasn’t replaced. With the removal of social housing 
from the market and the dismantling of rent controls and of legal protections for tenants, 
private landlords were free to raise rents astronomically, fuelling both the long-term housing 
boom which has had such deleterious effects on those social sectors unable to benefit from it, 
as well as massively increasing the public cost of subsidising the rents paid by welfare claimants 
to private landlords.43
 Consumption became central to Thatcherism’s iconography of ‘getting ahead’. The new 
vanguard of conspicuous consumption were the businessmen and women, the stockbrokers and 
yuppies whose speedily-acquired lavish lifestyles were documented in Sunday supplements and 
glossy ads. The idea of money pouring through the social body was enshrined in Harry Enfield’s 
comic TV character ‘Loadasmoney!’ (who had the cash, and flashed it; but he didn’t know how 
to spend it, just waving it around in a wad, embodying the new class distinctions between those 
who knew how to dispose of their income and those who didn’t). At the same time, income 
equality rose faster than in recorded history, child poverty doubled, unemployment rocketed, 
and the privatised utilities generated at least as many user complaints as the publicly-owned 
predecessors which they had been expected to outperform.
 This, then, was a moment when people were imagined exclusively as individual consumers, as 
wholly bounded entities whose only significant sites of sociality were their families. As Thatcher 
said in an interview for the magazine Women’s Own, ‘there is no such thing as society. There are 
men and women and children and there are families’. This phenomenally atomised view of 
society was made to seem familiar and unthreatening by figuring Britain as a household, with 
Thatcher in charge, balancing the household budget. As Angela McRobbie discusses elsewhere 
in this issue, drawing on Foucault, such figurations of ‘good housekeeping’ have been a recurring 
motif of national neoliberal cultures.44 While Thatcher was an arch anti-feminist, figuring the 
nation as a household with a consumer purse created a gendered appeal.45 Thatcher always 
had low electoral popularity but she was very successful at winning over women, particularly 
lower middle-class and upper working class women. These were receptive constituencies both 
because they had traditionally been denied access to power and because one of the few zones 
in which traditionally women have had, though in circumscribed fashion, more power than 
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men, is consumption.46 The use of consumerism as a means and an apparent visual index of 
greater social mobility was key to securing consent for Thatcherite neoliberalism.
 Under Thatcherism, then, what I am calling ‘meritocratic feeling’ was shaped and 
encouraged through aspirational femininity in particular and a very bounded, individualised 
(and/or nuclear family-based) form of consumerism in general. Popular support for Thatcherism 
was an expression of some of the most significant iniquities and discontents which the Fordist 
settlement had generated through its reliance on a hierarchical system of class, race and gender. 
Resentment at ingrained class hierarchies and gendered subordination were - along with gay 
rights and anti-racism - what fuelled the fractures in this settlement and the rebellions of the 
late 1960s, those social movements which were rupturing and staking their claim in 1968. 
Thatcherism’s deployment of a meritocratic popular consumerism addressed the gendered 
and classed components of this disgruntlement in particularly important ways. Its culture and 
rhetoric persuaded women, and especially lower-middle-class women, the people who voted for 
her most, that the pursuit of satisfaction as an individualised consumer in the private sphere 
was the route to empowerment and social mobility. Under Thatcherism meritocracy was thereby 
presented as a pragmatic and emancipatory social solution to the gendered inequalities and 
industrial ruptures of the Fordist welfare settlement.
BLAIRISM AND BEYOND
By the late 1990s, this marketised meaning of ‘meritocracy’ had become a key theme within 
New Labour policy discourse, which, whilst equally populist, was somewhat less anti-intellectual 
than Thatcherism. New Labour’s use of meritocratic themes had in part been influenced by 
the work of yet another prominent sociologist, Anthony Giddens, who in Where now for New 
Labour? argued strongly that ‘we should want a society that is more egalitarian than it is today, 
but which is meritocratic … a meritocratic approach to inequality is inevitable’.47 As John Beck 
argues, when the ‘m’ word was not always apparent, it was there in its constellation of synonyms: 
social inclusion, poverty of aspiration, social justice, talent, empowered individuals.48
 This dual embrace of the idea of retaining forms of social protection (which included, 
for example, the introduction of the minimum wage and paid paternity leave) alongside the 
erosion of social protection via neoliberal expansion (through, for example, the extended 
privatisations of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) , the introduction of academy schools, and 
the deregulation of the European labour market) structured and guided New Labour’s time in 
power. This back-and-forth movement was memorably termed ‘New Labour’s double shuffle’ by 
Stuart Hall.49 However, as Jeremy Gilbert pointed out in his response to Hall’s argument, the 
forms of protection being promoted were less consistent with social democratic egalitarianism 
than with neoliberal meritocracy which sought to provide ‘equality of opportunity’ on 
marketised and individualised terms.50
 The idea of movement ‘up’ the social ladder also raises the question of what exactly is being 
reached for. In The Rise of the Meritocracy what is being reached toward is a blend of money and 
classed prestige. By the late 1990s both were being reconfigured in the wake of the Thatcherite 
challenge to the social order and New Labour’s embrace of the financial sector, financialisation 
and of London as a centre for financial transactions and as the principle motor of the UK 
economy.51 As New Labour’s Trade and Industry Secretary Peter Mandelson famously put it in 
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1998, ‘we are intensely relaxed about people becoming filthy rich’.52 What was being positioned 
as ‘the top’ of the ladder was mutating, as CEO pay soared and ‘the demotic turn’ of reality TV 
shows popularised tempa-celebrities - or ‘celetoids’, to borrow Chris Rojek’s definition.53 What 
merit was, and how it was being ranked, was therefore changing to reflect New Labour’s dual 
imperatives of corporate growth and populist access - a phenomenon Anthony Barnett astutely 
termed ‘corporate populism’.54 As John Beck caustically put it, in his wonderful analysis of 
New Labour’s use of the term in relation to education, while even a brief dip into the history 
serves to highlight how meritocracy and measurement are perennially contested matters, this 
appears ‘to have had remarkably little effect on politicians, particularly those of the centre 
Left or centre Right, in whose discourse and policies, meritocratic ideas remain persistently 
prominent’.55
 But as the marketising effects of neoliberalism ripped through the forms of social protection 
built up in the mid-century, and the gap between rich and poor became increasingly graphic, 
more empirical and critical work emerged in and around social science in the 2000s on the 
limitations of ‘social mobility’ as a descriptive concept and a normative aim. In their 2009 
book The Meritocracy Myth, for instance, American sociologists Stephen McNamee and Robert 
Miller examine the prevailing belief that ‘people get out of the system what they put into it 
based on individual merit’ through an extensive series of case studies. They conclude that, 
while US society has reduced some of its prejudicial inequalities structuring the opportunities 
for women and non-whites, ‘the most important factor for determining where people end 
up economically is where they started in the first place’, that ‘the race is a relay race’.56 ‘The 
simple fact’, they write, ‘is that there is far more talent, intelligence, hard work, and ability in 
the population than there are people lucky enough to find themselves in a position to exploit 
them’.57 
‘ASPIRATION NATION’ AND THE HYPOCRISY OF THE NEW ELITES
At present in Britain the powerful language of aspiration, social mobility and opportunity for 
all to rise through the social structure has not become muted, despite a double-dip recession, 
still-growing inequality, and a historically unprecedented drop in living standards for the 
working majority. On the contrary: it has escalated under the Conservative-LibDem coalition 
government, whose use of the idea of meritocracy represents a new stage in its ‘development’. 
In this instance it has been deployed without the introduction of ameliorating initiatives or 
forms of collective provision (like the minimum wage), and in conjunction with specific policies 
aimed at cutting the incomes of the poor (like the Bedroom Tax). The coalition government 
has continued, and sped up, the implementation of neoliberal policies marketising the welfare 
state (such as the extension of internal markets and corporate involvement in prisons and 
in the health service) whilst using the alibi of the recession.58 At the 2012 Conservative Party 
conference, David Cameron declared that under his leadership Britain is now an ‘aspiration 
nation’: ‘we are the party of the want-to-be better-off ’.
 According to Cameron’s stated worldview, the ability to ‘believe in yourself ’, and by 
extension, your child, is primary. This is a discourse which vests not only power but also moral 
virtue in the very act of hope, in the mental and emotional capacity to believe and aspire. 
Hope and promise become more integral in an unequal society in which hard work alone 
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has less and less chance of reaping the prizes. Through this rhetorical mechanism, instead of 
addressing social inequality as a solvable problem, the act of addressing inequality becomes 
‘responsibilised’ as an individual’s moral meritocratic task. This process devolves onto the 
individual personal responsibility not just for their success in the meritocratic competition, 
but for the very will to compete and expectation of victory which are now figured as moral 
imperatives in themselves. Not investing in aspiration, in expectation, is aggressively positioned 
as an abdication of responsibility which condemns yourself - and even worse, your child - to 
the social scrapheap. To quote Cameron’s 2012 Conservative Party conference speech: 
It’s that toxic culture of low expectations - that lack of ambition for every child - which has 
held this country back. 
the Labour party theorists ... stand in the way of aspirational parents by excusing low 
expectations and blaming social disadvantage (Guardian 2012).
Here aspirational meritocracy works by positioning itself against - increasingly aggressively 
- any investment in collective provision as both a symptom and a cause of ‘low expectation’. 
In his 2013 party conference speech, Cameron re-iterated the ‘aspiration nation’ theme, 
intensifying the rhetoric by describing himself as engaged in a battle against opponents whom 
he characterised explicitly as non-hard workers - ‘smug, self-satisfied socialists’. ‘That’s who 
we’re fighting against’, he asserted; ‘And we know who we’re fighting for: for all those who 
work hard and want to get on’.59
 Here, social disadvantage is only ‘real’ in that it is an obstacle over which pure mental 
will and aspiration - if they are expressed correctly by being combined with hard work - can 
triumph. These tropes and discursive elements generate an affective mode which Lauren 
Berlant aptly identifies as ‘cruel optimism’. This is the affective state produced under neoliberal 
culture which is cruel because it encourages an optimistic attachment to the idea of a brighter 
future whilst such attachments are, simultaneously, ‘actively impeded’ by the harsh precarities 
and instabilities of neoliberalism.60 If ‘Aspiration Nation’ is related to such ‘cruel optimism’, 
it also draws on the English trope of ‘having a go’, which involves a sort of non-competitive 
competitiveness, of being prepared to compete without any expectation of winning, out of a 
recognition that sporting competition is a mode of social participation; although the difference 
is that in the Aspiration Nation you can’t just do your best: you have to want to win.
 Even the psychosocial resources required to engage in aspiration are considerable and easier 
for some classes to obtain and deploy than others. There is a rich tradition in the cultural 
studies of education analysing how middle-class children are encouraged to aspire whilst 
working class children are - to cite the title of Paul Willis’s classic book - Learning to Labour.61 
Valerie Gilles’ recent analysis of aspirational language used - or not - by parents when talking 
about their child’s behaviour at school is particularly instructive here. Her research showed 
how for working-class parents, the attributes most likely to be proudly described were children’s 
ability to stay out of trouble, get on with others, and work hard, which inculcates the strength 
to struggle and to defend scant resources; whereas middle-class parents foster ‘the right to be 
bright’ and code problematic behaviour in the classroom in terms of intelligence and of needs 
the classroom should be able to accommodate, which helps reproduce middle-class success. 
Gilles criticises New Labour’s education policy for encoding middle-class behaviour as morally 
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correct and blaming the poor ‘with almost missionary zeal’ for their own failure.62
 Such tendencies have been continued and extended in politics and popular culture since 
2005. There is now a widespread tendency to ‘blame the parents’ for any problems at the 
expense of any other social factor such as economic and social impoverishment. This tendency 
is conveyed, for instance, through the fixation on parenting styles ‘over and above all other 
factors’ in relation to children’s behaviour and life chances;63 foregrounded through framing 
of parental responsibility by TV programmes such as Supernanny64 and in government and 
media responses to the London riots.65 This tendency is tied up with how, as Angela McRobbie 
argues in this issue, the family is increasingly figured as a bounded entrepreneurial unit.66
 ‘Aspiration Nation’ as a rhetorical strategy, and as an expression of meritocratic feeling, 
connects self-belief and aspiration with the trope of hard work. It is striking how, again and 
again, ‘hard work’ combined with self-belief is employed by an unprecedentedly privileged 
cadre of politicians and millionaire elites to justify their position and success and to prescribe 
this as the route for others. ‘Working hard and wanting to get on’ is the way to progress. This 
trope has been repeatedly deployed by Conservative MP and Mayor of London Boris Johnson, 
who, in the words of the Daily Mail, ‘hailed the Olympics for embodying the “Conservative 
lesson of life” that hard work leads to reward’67 and more recently told Britons that they needed 
to work harder otherwise jobs would go to economic migrants.68
 How does this rhetoric of ‘hard work’, such a feature of the contemporary meritocratic deal, 
work, given that there is a swathe of research proving that inheriting opportunity in the form 
of finance and social connections is by far more important a factor in the route to riches?69 
It is notable that plenty of millionaires who inherited their wealth, including Boris Johnson 
and David Cameron, conveniently promote hard work as the most influential factor in social 
mobility. Such discourse simultaneously helps to erase any image of over-privileged indolence 
from the speaker’s persona whilst interpellating the listener as able to achieve a similar social 
status; a degree of social mobility which is in practice attainable only for a tiny minority. As 
MacNamee and Miller put it, ‘meritocracy tends to be believed in more by the privileged’.70 
But the rhetoric of ‘hard work’ is crucial to today’s meritocratic feeling. In research recently 
conducted in St Pauls, an elite North American fee-paying school, Khan and Jerolmack noted 
that typically these students were conscious of the idea of their privilege, and replaced a frame 
of entitlement with one based around merit by continually emphasising how hard they’d 
worked. The researchers argued that ‘they generally do not work hard, although they are 
adept at performing a kind of busyness that looks and feels like hard work.’ (Students that did 
regularly go to the library were conversely positioned as ‘freaks’). As they put it, ‘“hard work” 
is mostly a form of talk - but important talk nonetheless. It is a rhetorical strategy deployed 
by students in a world of “new elites”’. These are elites ‘saying meritocracy but doing the ease 
of privilege’.71
 Similarly, the coalition’s investment in ‘hard work’ is classed: it is coded as ‘graft’ even when 
it’s being voiced by million/billionaires, celebrities and children at elite private fee-paying 
schools. This is not completely new: it was a key element in the rhetoric of Thatcherism as well as 
Blairism. Thatcher notably used a version of this rhetoric which was both structured through the 
decline of deference and classed through its rhetoric of rising up through the classes. As Peter 
Clarke and Tom Mills point out, the importance to her success of her husband’s considerable 
wealth was barely acknowledged by Thatcher. She preferred to dwell on her humble roots as 
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a grocer’s daughter and to imagine that her achievements were attributable to drudgery and 
self-discipline’.72 Cameron and his cabinet, just like Boris Johnson, do not draw on such early 
moments in their self narrative to calibrate work as classed graft, mainly because they don’t 
have them: their backgrounds are aristocratic or quasi-aristocratic. They do, however, borrow 
the classed rhetoric of ‘hard work’ - just like the privileged children interviewed by Khan and 
Jerolmack; and the very act of saying ‘hard work’ invites those who do work hard to identify 
with them and flatters the rest. Then ‘hard work’ is connected, rather than to a particular 
lower-class reflexive position, to the necessity of having aspirations: you can’t have one without 
the other, in this worldview: to lack either is a moral failure.
In this way Cameron and Johnson do what Thatcher did but de-articulate the highly selective, 
reflexive class biographical detail and replace it with a generalised notion of aspiration. These 
actions are similar ones to those offered by Blairism, although the crucial difference is the 
Conservatives’ dispensing with the concessions to equality of opportunity that Blair promoted 
- whilst pushing through neoliberal reforms - in favour of a much more dramatic cutting of 
the social safety net. This makes the distance aspiration needs to travel that much further and 
far less likely to be traversed. 
STRIVERS V SKIVERS
Meritocracy is a word with a short etymological history - under 60 years - but during this time 
it has gradually and dramatically shifted in its meaning. It has moved from a disparaging 
reference to an embryonic system of state organisation creating problematic hierarchies 
through a dubious notion of ‘merit’, to a celebratory term connecting competitive individualism 
and an essentialised notion of ‘talent’ with a belief in the desirability and possibility of social 
mobility in a highly unequal society. It emerged as a word at the high point of the British 
welfare state both as a celebration of the greater degrees of social equality and social mobility 
that many - though not all - experienced at that time, and simultaneously as a critique of 
emergent hierarchies based on troublingly essentialised notions of aptitude and an ambiguous 
anxiety about the forms of inequality such notions were beginning to engender. It was initially 
mobilised as a term through a radical socialist discourse: an origin which until now has been 
lost and obscured in favour of Young’s left-liberal stance.
 As a discourse, meritocracy was mobilised gradually into, through and by neoliberalism, 
although this has happened in diverse, sometimes erratic ways. It has been and continues 
to be shaped as a discourse by diverse constituencies, agents and sites including popular 
culture, social theory and political rhetoric. As this essay has attempted to show, what I have 
termed ‘meritocratic feeling’ has taken different forms in neoliberal culture. In Britain, for 
instance, Thatcherism’s elision of collective state welfare with the ingrained privileges of ‘the 
great and the good’, and its exploitation of the gendered weaknesses of the Fordist settlement 
were mobilised into an anti-intellectual acquisitive, consumerist form of meritocracy. The 
‘meritocratic feeling’ promulgated by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
at present perpetuates - like the Labour government before it - a possessive individualist, 
consumerist notion of meritocracy; but it is a meritocratic feeling which moves further by vesting 
moral virtue in the act or affects of aspiration and hope; one which is, when combined with the 
trope of ‘hard work’, explicitly pitted against any form of collective provision or mutual forms 
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of social reproduction. ‘Aspiration nation’ defines itself against mutuality. You are a striver 
or a skiver: believing in the necessity of any kind of collective form of social reproduction is 
demarcated as simply a lazy excuse for not striving.
Through neoliberalism meritocracy has become an alibi for plutocracy, or government by a 
wealthy elite. It has become a key ideological term in the reproduction of neoliberal culture 
in Britain. It has done so by seizing the idea, practice and discourse of greater social equality 
which emerged in the first half of the twentieth century and marketising it. Meritocracy, as a 
potent blend of an essentialised notion of ‘talent’, competitive individualism and belief in social 
mobility, is mobilised to both disguise and gain consent for the economic inequalities wrought 
through neoliberalism. However, at the same time, such discourse is neither inevitable nor 
consistent. It requires actively reinforcing and reproducing and can be augmented and shaped 
in a number of different places and spaces. The alternative to plutocracy-as-meritocracy is a 
more plural understanding of ‘merit’ - which considers ‘merit’ on a collective and not a purely 
individual basis - alongside mutual and co-operative forms of social reproduction which create 
greater parity in wealth, opportunity, care and provision.
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